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1 Introduction  
A basic prerequisite for a conviction in all criminal justice systems is that the 
defendant acted with the requisite mens rea for the offence; usually a form of 
intent, recklessness, or negligence. This article discusses the way intent has been, 
and should be, dealt with by Swedish courts when it comes to international 
crimes. The main purpose of this article is to clarify whether Swedish courts 
should apply intent according to international criminal law1 or according to 
Swedish criminal law when adjudicating cases concerning these crimes. This 
discussion is important since international criminal law requires a higher form 
of intent than Swedish criminal law. The application by Swedish courts of intent 
as articulated in international criminal law would therefore have consequences 
for the prosecution of international crimes and would lead to fragmentation of 
the Swedish legal system.  
Central to this discussion are Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which provides a definition of intent in 
international criminal law, and Swedish criminal law regulations. The present 
analysis regarding intent is based primarily on Swedish criminal cases 
concerning intent for international crimes, and cases from the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
Regarding Swedish criminal law, these issues will be discussed in relation to 
Swedish criminal regulations applicable before and after 1 July 2014. This date 
is important, since it marks the entry into force of the Act on Criminal 
Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes 
(2014:406), which applies to offences committed after 1 July 2014. However, 
the previous offence “crime against international law” (Swedish Criminal Code, 
Ch. 22 Sec. 6), still applies to acts committed before 1 July 2014. Generally, 
there is also an important difference between the regulations applicable before 
and after 1 July 2014. The regulation applicable to offences committed before 1 
July 2014 directs the courts to consider customary international law when 
adjudicating international crimes at the national level. This follows from the 
wording of the provision on crime against international law and the travaux 
préparatoires. However, the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, 
Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes (2014:406) does not refer to 
customary international law.2 
Our review of both international and Swedish legislation and criminal case 
law shows no support for the view that Swedish courts should apply existing 
rules of international criminal law concerning intent when adjudicating 
                                                 
1  We here refer to international criminal law as regulated in international treaties and 
customary international law and as interpreted by international criminal tribunals and 
international criminal courts. 
2  On the differences between the regulations applied before and after 1 July 2014, see further 
prop. 2013/14:146, p. 68; Klamberg, Mark, International Criminal Law in Swedish Courts: 
The Principle of Legality in the Arklöv Case, International Criminal Law Review, 2009, vol. 
9, no. 2, p. 397–398, 402, 405; Klamberg, Mark, The Evolution of Swedish Legislation on 
International Crimes, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 2020, vol. 66, Sections 5 and 6. 
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international crimes at the national level.3 Furthermore, nothing suggests that 
international rules regarding intent have reached the level of customary 
international law, or that Swedish courts are in any way legally bound to apply 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute. Consequently, Swedish courts are not obliged to 
apply existing international criminal law rules regarding intent. 
2 Intent in Common and Civil Law Systems  
To understand the meaning of intent in international criminal law it is first 
necessary to have basic knowledge of how intent is perceived in different 
jurisdictions. This varies both between common law and civil law systems and 
between countries within each of these legal traditions.4 It is therefore not 
entirely easy to translate the terminology used for terms/concepts that are 
perceived as intent according to current Swedish criminal law. A concrete 
example of this difficulty is that what is called reckless intent5 in Swedish 
criminal law is best compared to the common law term “recklessness” or the 
civil law term dolus eventualis. The problem with recklessness is that this term 
would correspond in Swedish criminal law to something between the lowest 
form of intent (reckless intent) and conscious negligence,6 which is a different 
form of mens rea than intent.7 This article will therefore begin with a brief 
discussion of the terminology used in common law and civil law systems, which 
will highlight commonalities and differences. We emphasise again that writing 
about intent in different jurisdictions and legal systems entails great challenges. 
With this in mind, the discussion below offers a basic overview of the different 
concepts and terms used in different legal systems. This is necessary in order to 
understand the concept of intent in international criminal law.  
In English, the legal term mens rea denotes the mental element necessary for 
a conviction for a particular offence, e.g. intent, recklessness, or negligence. 
Common law and civil law jurisdictions use different categories to describe mens 
rea, which might be similar but are not necessarily complete equivalents, and 
which cause difficulties for any discussion regarding intent. Indeed, there is deep 
ambiguity over what is meant by the concept of intent. The tension is 
                                                 
3  As will be seen below the exception is for the crime of genocide, which in Swedish law is 
defined exactly as in international instruments and requires special intent.  
4  For a review of intent in selected common law and civil law countries that shows these 
differences, see e.g. Marchuk, Iryna, The Fundamental Concept of Crime in International 
Criminal Law. A Comparative Law Analysis, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 
2014, p. 7–67. 
5  In Swedish “likgiltighetsuppsåt”. 
6  In Swedish “(medveten) oaktsamhet”. 
7  It is however more complicated than this. For a thorough discussion about how 
“recklessness” should be understood in a Swedish context, see Jareborg, Nils & Ulväng, 
Magnus, Tanke och uppsåt, Uppsala: Iustus, 2016, p. 246–268. In particular, see the 
illustration on p. 256 showing how the English criminal law terms “intent”, “recklessness” 
and “negligence” can be categorised from a Swedish perspective.  
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compounded by the fact that the ambiguity stretches along two axes: across legal 
cultures and across bodies of law.8 
In Anglo-American common law, intent can be divided into two categories: 
direct intent and indirect/oblique intent.9 Direct intent is where a person intended 
the outcome or result of his/her act or omission.10 For example, in English 
criminal law direct intent is where the defendant’s aim, purpose, or objective is 
to bring about a consequence or result. The leading authority defines direct intent 
as:  
a decision to bring about, insofar as it lies within the accused’s power, [a particular 
consequence], no matter whether the accused desired that consequence of his act or 
not.11 
Other common law systems use similar explanations for direct intent. For 
example, the Criminal Code of Australia speaks of what can be considered direct 
intent when the defendant means to engage in a conduct or means to bring about 
a certain result.12 In addition, in the US Model Penal Code direct intent is where 
the defendant’s conscious object is ‘to engage in [a particular] conduct … or to 
cause [a particular] result’.13  
Indirect intent is where the defendant does not have the aim, purpose, or 
objective to bring about a particular result, but where the result is a virtually 
certain consequence of the defendant’s conduct, and the defendant realises this,14 
or the defendant is aware that a result will occur ‘in the ordinary course of 
events’.15 
Recklessness is another form of mens rea used in common law systems. It is 
about foresight of a risk and the unjustifiable or unreasonable taking of that 
risk,16 and is thus different from intent. One question regarding recklessness is 
                                                 
8  Ohlin, Jens David, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, Michigan Journal of International 
law, 2013, vol. 35, no. 1, 79, p. 82. 
9  For the purposes of this article, we will use the term “indirect intent”, since this is the term 
used in international criminal law; and to minimise confusion.  
10  Guilfoyle, Douglas, International Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 
188. 
11  R v. Mohan [1976] QB 1 (CA). 
12  Criminal Code Act 1995 (2019) Australian Government, Compilation No. 127, Section 
5.2(1) and (3). 
13  US Model Penal Code (1985) The American Law Institute, Section 2.02(2)(a).  
14  R v. Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 (CA); R v. Woollin [1998] AC 82 (HL); Child, John & 
Ormerod, David, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Essentials of Criminal Law, 3 edn., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 97–99. In Nedrick the trial judge had directed the jury that 
the defendant could be liable for murder if he foresaw death or serious bodily harm as highly 
probable. This was overruled by the Court of Appeal, which stated that foresight of virtual 
certainty was necessary. 
15  Australian Criminal Code, Section 5.2(3). See also US Model Penal Code, (1985) The 
American Law Institute, Section 2.02(2)(b): ‘if the element involves a result of his conduct, 
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.’ 
16  Cassese, Antonio & Gaeta, Paola, Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 3 edn., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 41; Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 188; R v. Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 
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the level of risk that must be foreseen by the defendant, and common law systems 
take different views. Australian law requires awareness of a ‘substantial risk’,17 
while the US Model Penal Code requires the conscious disregard of ‘a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk’.18 However, in English law the foresight of 
any risk is sufficient.19 According to some scholars, recklessness requires either 
foresight of a probable risk or simply of a possible risk.20 Sometimes 
recklessness will also cover failure to give an obvious and unjustifiable risk any 
thought (wilful blindness).21 In English law the defendant will be reckless even 
if he or she did not foresee the risk at the time of the offence because he or she 
had ‘closed his [or her] mind to the obvious’.22  
Some scholars argue that common law systems, generally speaking, recognise 
three forms of intent: direct intent, indirect intent and recklessness.23 However, 
the above shows that this appears not to be true – at least regarding the common 
law jurisdictions discussed above, since these clearly view recklessness as a 
separate form of mens rea and not a form of intent. Thus, while both intent and 
recklessness are clearly included in the concept of mens rea, it is in our view 
clear that recklessness cannot be viewed as a form of intent.  
In civil law systems there are three categories of mens rea that are largely 
seen as intent. The first is dolus directus (or dolus directus in the first degree), 
which can be said to correspond to direct intent in common law, i.e. where the 
outcome is intended by the defendant.24 This is also seemingly how dolus 
directus has been explained at the ICC, as will be seen below in Section 4.3 
(Intent at the ICC). The second form of intent in civil law is dolus indirectus (or 
dolus directus in the second degree). This has been said to be where the 
defendant is indifferent to the result of his or her conduct, but knew it to be a 
certain or highly probable consequence. This is similar to indirect intent in 
common law, but does not appear to require foresight of a virtual certainty.25 
The lowest form of intent in civil law is dolus eventualis, of which there are 
competing versions.26 According to one, dolus eventualis is where the defendant 
foresees the result as being reasonably probable, or at least possible, as the 
consequence of his or her act, and accepts or reconciles him- or herself to the 
                                                 
396 (CA); R v. G [2003] UKHL 50. See also US Model Penal Code (1985) The American 
Law Institute, Section 2.02(2)(c); Australian Criminal Code, Section 5.4. 
17  Australian Criminal Code, Section 5.4.  
18  Model Penal Code (1985) The American Law Institute, Section 2.02.(2)(c). 
19  R v. Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413 (CA). 
20  Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 188. 
21  Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 188–189. 
22  R v. Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600 (CA). 
23  Finnin, Sarah, Mental Elements under Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: a Comparative Analysis, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 2012, 
vol. 61, no. 2, p. 328. 
24  Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 189. See also Cassese & Gaeta, 2013, p. 41. 
25  Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 189. 
26  Ohlin, 2013, p. 83. See also Finnin, 2012, p. 334. 
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fact that this may occur.27 Some scholars have therefore noted that if this version 
is not what in common law is described as recklessness, it is at least as close to 
recklessness as one can get in civil law. 28  
However, it has been questioned whether dolus eventualis qualifies as a form 
of intent in civil law.29 Some have noted that dolus eventualis is included in the 
definition of intent in German and Dutch law, but is excluded from intent in 
French law.30 Others have noted that dolus eventualis (or versions of it) is used 
in Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, and German law, but not in Russian law (or is 
not used in the same way).31 It has also been pointed out that, for example, ‘to a 
U.S. criminal lawyer [as a common law lawyer], the idea that dolus eventualis is 
a form of “intent” is nonsensical’, as only acting with purpose and knowledge 
constitute forms of intent in common law.32 This is probably true generally for 
lawyers trained in common law systems.  
There has also been much debate among international lawyers as to whether 
recklessness and dolus eventualis are the same or whether dolus eventualis is a 
distinct form of mens rea which, in a cognitive sense, is higher than recklessness 
but lower than the other forms of dolus.33 For lawyers from the common law 
tradition it probably seems obvious that dolus eventualis is more like 
recklessness than intent.34 However, for lawyers from at least some civil law 
countries it is probably just as obvious that dolus eventualis is a form of intent.  
3 Intent in Swedish Law 
Two types of mens rea exist in Swedish criminal law: intent and negligence. 
According to the Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 1 Sec. 2 para. 1, intent is the 
standard form of mens rea and negligence can only be applied if it is explicitly 
stated in a certain provision that this form of mens rea is enough to establish 
liability. Since this article only concerns intentional conduct, it does not discuss 
negligence as a form of mens rea. The following section offers a brief, general 
overview of the meaning of intent as a mens rea element in Swedish criminal 
law.35 
                                                 
27  Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 189. 
28  Cassese & Gaeta, 2013, p. 41; Finnin, 2012, p. 334.  
29  Ohlin, 2013, p. 83. 
30  van Sliedregt, Elies, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003, p. 46. 
31  Marchuk, 2014, p. 66. 
32  Ohlin, 2013, p. 83. 
33  Ohlin, 2013, p. 89. See also Finnin, 2012, p. 330. 
34  See e.g. Ohlin, 2013, p. 89. 
35  For a more thorough read on intent in Swedish criminal law, see e.g. the following cases from 
the Swedish Supreme Court: NJA 2002 s. 449; NJA 2004 s. 176 and NJA 2016 s. 763. See 
also the travaux préparatoires: SOU 1996:185, part I, p. 81–145. See also Asp, Petter, 
Ulväng, Magnus & Jareborg, Nils, Kriminalrättens grunder. Svensk straffrätt I, 2 edn, 
Uppsala: Iustus, 2013, p. 284–314; Ulväng & Jareborg, 2016; Bäcklund, Agneta, et al., 
Brottsbalken (17 April 2019, Zeteo), commentary to the Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 1 Sec. 
2, under the heading Första stycket; Ågren, Jack, Leijonhufvud, Madeleine & Wennberg, 
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When the courts assess whether a defendant acted with intent, the so-called 
“principle of correspondence”36 is essential. Correspondence here basically 
means that the court should assess whether the way the defendant perceived the 
course of events is in line with the wording of the provision in question. For the 
court to find that the defendant acted with intent, the defendant’s perception of 
the course of events should be reasonably consistent with what the prosecutor is 
able to prove. In the literature, this is often expressed as the defendant’s intent 
needing to “correspond” to what can be proven in court.37 However, the principle 
only states that the defendant needs to have acted with intent; it does not clarify 
what degree of intent is necessary. 
Although Sweden is usually categorised as a civil law jurisdiction, it should 
be noted that no provision in Swedish law defines intent.38 The different forms 
of intent and their meaning have been developed mainly through the case law of 
the Swedish Supreme Court. The case law has also been influenced to some 
degree by literature. The scholarly discussion in Sweden, as well as that in the 
case law, has focused mainly on the difference between intent and negligence, 
where the primary question has been to clarify the lowest form of intent (to 
differentiate this from the highest form of negligence). Currently in Swedish 
criminal law, intent can be divided into three categories: direct intent, indirect 
intent, and reckless intent. Unless otherwise provided, the main rule is that 
reckless intent is sufficient to prove that the defendant acted with intent. 
Direct intent is where a person means to perform a criminal act with a certain 
objective or purpose, which would for example be the case if the defendant, out 
of jealousy, killed another human being. In that case, the result (i.e. death) is the 
purpose of the defendant’s act. In Swedish criminal law direct intent is only 
applicable if the elements of the offence are expressed in such a way that they 
                                                 
Suzanne, Straffansvar, 10 edn., Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2018, p. 92–97; Strahl, Ivar, 
Allmän straffrätt i vad angår brotten, Stockholm: Norstedt, 1976, p. 89–128; Thyrén, Johan 
C W, Principerna för en strafflagsreform III. Brottsbegreppets subjektiva sida. Försök. 
Subjektsflerhet. Sammanfattning av de legislativa resultaterna i delarne I–III, Lund: Gleerup, 
1914, p. 3–46; Hagströmer, Johan, Svensk straffrätt. Föreläsningar. Första bandet, Uppsala: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1901–1905, p. 176–211. 
36  In Swedish “täckningsprincipen”. The principle of correspondence is the term used in some 
common law jurisdictions, see e.g. Horder, Jeremy, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law, 
9 edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 176. The principle of correspondence and 
“täckningsprincipen” are equivalent. For the purpose of this article, we use the English term 
to avoid confusion. 
37  See further e.g. Agge, Ivar, Straffrättens allmänna del. Föreläsningar. Andra häftet, 
Stockholm: Norstedt, 1961, p. 255–264; Strahl, 1976, p. 119–127; Asp et al., 2013, p. 64, 
270, 323–361; Bäcklund, Agneta, et al., Brottsbalken (17 April 2019, Zeteo), commentary to 
the Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 1 Sec. 2, under the heading Vad ska uppsåtet täcka?. 
38  A government inquiry proposed that the following definition of intent should be introduced: 
‘A deed [i.e. criminal act or crime of omission] is committed with intent if it is deliberate or 
if it corresponds to what the perpetrator has realised, perceived or accepted about the deed.’ 
[Our translation from Swedish.] See SOU 1996:185, p. 55, 108–127. However, the definition 
was not introduced in the written Swedish law, see prop. 2000/01:85, p. 9–13. The rationale 
for this was the government’s opinion that the existing forms of intent were well defined and 
that an amendment of the statutory law required a more thorough analysis of the 
consequences of an amendment, in particular in relation to various offences. A definition of 
intent has also been suggested by a previous government inquiry, see SOU 1923:9, p. 8. 
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require a particular result or effect. This normally follows from the wording of 
the provision in question. The following phrases are examples of what is 
generally viewed as an expression of a requirement of direct intent: with the 
intention of, for the purpose of, seek to. Thus, direct intent in Swedish criminal 
law is essentially equivalent to direct intent in common law and dolus directus 
in civil law. 
Indirect intent in Swedish law is where the defendant is practically certain 
that a result or an effect will occur or that a condition exists.39 In that case, the 
defendant has no doubt that a result or an effect will occur as a consequence of 
his or her conduct, or that a condition exists. An example that is commonly used 
in Swedish criminal law textbooks to illustrate indirect intent is a ship-owner 
who places a bomb on a ship, with the purpose of causing the ship to explode at 
sea and sink, so that the owner can claim compensation through his insurance.40 
Thus, the aim of the conduct is to get insurance money, not to kill or seriously 
harm the people on board. However, in this case, the ship-owner acts with 
indirect intent since, even though his purpose is not to kill anyone, he is 
practically certain that this will be the result when the ship sinks.41 Thus, indirect 
intent in Swedish law is the equivalent to indirect intent in common law and 
dolus indirectus in civil law. 
As mentioned above, the lowest form of intent in Swedish law is reckless 
intent, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in NJA 2004 s. 176.42 The 
Supreme Court stated the following: 
In order to conclude that the defendant acted with intent in relation to the effect or 
to the circumstance in question, indifference is required not only to the existence of 
the risk, but also to the realisation of the effect or the occurrence of the circumstance 
(…) The decisive element is that the realisation of the effect or the occurrence of the 
circumstance at the time of the crime did not constitute a relevant reason for the 
defendant to abstain from the act. If the defendant acted with the assurance that the 
effect would not be realised or that the occurrence of the circumstance was not 
present, he is not considered indifferent in this sense, although his attitude may 
appear to be irresponsible.43 
                                                 
39  See e.g. NJA 2004 s. 176, particularly at p. 194–195; NJA 1977 s. 630, particularly at p. 638. 
40  The case of the ship-owner is, for example, used by Asp et al., 2013, p. 289. 
41  Compare NJA 1927 s. 1, where the defendants blew up a car with the intention of killing the 
passenger in the car. The driver was wounded in the explosion, which was not something that 
the defendants intended. The Supreme Court held that the driver’s injuries were, in relation 
to the death of the passenger, a necessary effect. Thus, the defendants were found guilty of 
attempt to murder. 
42  In an earlier Supreme Court case, NJA 2002 s. 449, the matter of the lowest form of intent 
(so as to differentiate between the lowest form of intent and the highest form of negligence) 
was raised. However, in that case the Supreme Court seems to have remained undecided as 
to whether reckless intent should be held as the lowest form of intent or not. It should also be 
noted that the Supreme Court has previously reasoned in terms of reckless intent, see e.g. 
NJA 1975 s. 594; NJA 1985 s. 757; NJA 1990 s. 210; NJA 1996 s. 509. 
43  NJA 2004 s. 176, at p. 198. In Swedish: ‘För att uppsåt till effekten eller omständigheten 
skall anses föreligga krävs dock likgiltighet inte endast till risken utan också till 
förverkligandet av effekten eller förekomsten av omständigheten. (…) Det avgörande är 
således att förverkligandet av effekten eller förekomsten av omständigheten, vid 
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From this statement it is possible to draw two conclusions. First, the defendant 
must be indifferent to the existence of a certain effect, result or circumstance. 
According to Swedish law, this is the same thing as being consciously negligent. 
Second, the defendant must also be indifferent to the realisation of the effect, 
result or circumstance, i.e. the defendant simply accepts the effect, result or 
circumstance that occurs – or might occur – as a consequence of his or her 
conduct. In Swedish law, it is thus the second point that determines whether the 
defendant acted with intent or negligence. 
As mentioned above (Section 2, Intent in Common and Civil Law Systems), 
it is somewhat difficult to compare reckless intent with forms of mens rea in 
other jurisdictions. From a common law perspective, Swedish reckless intent 
could – at least partly – be categorised as recklessness.44 From a civil law 
perspective, it would be correct to claim that reckless intent is a kind of dolus 
eventualis.45 
Even though the Swedish Supreme Court in NJA 2004 s. 176 held that 
reckless intent is the lowest form of intent in Swedish criminal law, the matter 
of reckless intent was again raised in a later case. In NJA 2016 s. 763 the 
Supreme Court held that it was necessary to clarify the meaning and scope of 
reckless intent. The Court held that reckless intent should be applied when the 
defendant perceived that it was highly probable that a result would occur (as a 
consequence of his or her conduct). However, the Court further stated that 
reckless intent should also be applied when the defendant otherwise assumed – 
in the sense that he or she calculated or assumed – that a result would occur.46 
However, it is rather unclear whether this case actually contributed to clarifying 
the meaning and scope of reckless intent as formulated in NJA 2004 s. 176.47 
Finally, other aspects regarding reckless intent deserve mentioning. The 
prevailing opinion amongst legal scholars seems to be that the reasoning in NJA 
2004 s. 176 to some extent clarified the division between the lowest form of 
intent and the highest form of negligence.48 However, the significance of the 
                                                 
gärningstillfället inte utgjorde ett för gärningsmannen relevant skäl för att avstå från 
gärningen. Har gärningsmannen handlat i förlitan på att effekten inte skulle förverkligas eller 
gärningsomständigheten föreligga har han inte varit likgiltig i denna mening även om hans 
inställning kan framstå som lättsinnig.’ 
44  Compare for example how recklessness in English common law is described by Horder, 
2019, p. 196–202. 
45  See Ulväng & Jareborg, 2016, p. 116, stating that it is evident that reckless intent is a form 
of dolus eventualis. 
46  NJA 2016 s. 763, particularly at p. 775 (para. 22). 
47  The decision in NJA 2016 s. 763 raised the question of whether the decision actually clarified 
the meaning of reckless intent, as stated in NJA 2004 s. 176. See further Wennberg, Suzanne, 
Likgiltighetsuppsåtet igen – en ny dom som inte kommer att bli vägledande?, Juridisk 
Tidskrift, 2016/17, no. 3, p. 722–727; Borgeke, Martin, Ett förtydligande av uppsåtets nedre 
gräns, Svensk juristtidning, 2017, no. 2, p. 93–105; Svensson, Erik, Ett förtydligande av 
uppsåtets nedre gräns?, Svensk juristtidning, 2017, no. 3, p. 182–190; Wennberg, Suzanne, 
Replik till Martin Borgeke – likgiltighetsuppsåtet igen, Svensk juristtidning, 2017, no. 4, p. 
269–173; Borgeke, Martin, Slutreplik till Suzanne Wennberg om likgiltighetsuppsåtet, 
Svensk juristtidning, 2017, no. 7, p. 441–444. It should be noted that Borgeke was one of the 
judges on the Supreme Court panel that decided the case.  
48  See e.g. Asp et al., 2013, p. 290–293. 
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verdict in NJA 2004 s. 176 was not only the Swedish Supreme Court’s definition 
of reckless intent. From the ruling in NJA 2004 s. 176, as well as in NJA 2016 
s. 763, it is quite clear that another (more) important matter was what evidence 
generally could be used to prove whether the defendant acted with intent.49 It is 
also rather evident that neither the definition of reckless intent nor other ways of 
defining the lowest form of intent can solve the evidential difficulties that 
(generally) arise.50 A clear indication of this is that the Swedish Supreme Court 
in NJA 2004 s. 176 stated that the previous lowest form of intent (dolus 
eventualis with a hypothetical test)51 can still largely be used to argue that the 
defendant acted with intent. Thus, one could argue that the ruling in NJA 2004 
s. 176 means mainly that the issues involved in the previous ways of defining 
the lowest form of intent simply shifted to being a question of evidence. This can 
also be observed in the reasoning of the Swedish Supreme Court in NJA 2016 s. 
763. 
4 Intent in International Criminal Law  
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
Various forms of mens rea apply to international crimes, from intent to 
recklessness and, it has been argued, negligence.52 The mens rea in international 
criminal law, like in criminal law in domestic jurisdictions, varies depending on 
the offence and modes of liability in question and will thus be addressed when 
dealing with that specific offence or liability issue.53 
As was noted in Section 2 (Intent in Common and Civil Law Systems) there 
are different views in national legal systems about what is meant by the concept 
of intent. The ambiguity that exists among the different national jurisdictions is 
reflected in international criminal law. Indeed, there is some ambiguity regarding 
intent in international criminal law, which is understandable since judges from 
different countries serving at international courts and tribunals are probably 
influenced by how this concept is defined and understood in their respective 
legal systems. The same is probably true among scholars.  
                                                 
49  NJA 2004 s. 176, particularly at p. 199–200; NJA 2016 s. 763, particularly at p. 775–776. 
50  For some general thoughts on how to prove that the defendant acted with intent, in particular 
how to prove reckless intent, see Asp et al., 2013, p. 294–300; Ulväng & Jareborg, 2016, p. 
208–245. 
51  The previous lowest form of intent – dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test, also known as 
conditional intent – is when the defendant appreciated that it was possible that the effect 
would occur, i.e. that there was a risk of that effect. In addition, it was required that the court 
conduct a “hypothetical test”. The court had to conclude that it could be assumed with 
certainty that the defendant would have committed the act even if he/she had been sure that 
the effect would occur. See e.g. SOU 1996:185, part 1, p. 86; Wennberg, Suzanne, ‘Criminal 
Law’, in Bogdan, Michael (ed.), Swedish Legal System, Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik, 2010, 
p. 164–165; Asp et al, 2013, p. 302–304. 
52  Cryer, Robert, Robinson, Darryl, & Vasiliev, Sergey, An Introduction to International 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 4 edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, p. 365. 
53  Cryer et al., 2019, p. 365. 
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It has also been pointed out that some of the discussion in the case law of 
international courts regarding mens rea, particularly from the ICTY and the 
ICTR, is confused because these tribunals appear to have used the term intent to 
refer to mens rea generally.54 In addition, while “intention” and “intent” may 
sometimes be used interchangeably, for clarity, this article will use the term mens 
rea to mean the mental element of an offence, and “intent” to mean the highest 
form of mens rea, particularly since this is how the term is used in the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. 
4.2 Intent at the ICTY and the ICTR 
Except for in relation to the crime of genocide,55 the statutes of the ICTY and 
the ICTR did not address mens rea and consequently this had to be addressed 
through jurisprudence.56 According to some scholars, the Tribunals have been 
reticent in setting out the elements of intent.57  
The ICTY and the ICTR have both held that the required mens rea for 
international crimes may be satisfied either by intent or a lesser form of intent 
that is greater than negligence.58 It is however not always easy to understand 
how intent has been interpreted. This is partly because these tribunals often do 
not seem to have defined intent, and partly because they have not always clearly 
distinguished between direct and indirect intent. The earliest cases stated that 
intent ‘involves awareness of the act […] coupled with a conscious decision to 
participate [in a crime]’.59 Some chambers have instead held that ‘the result is 
intended when it is the actor’s purpose, or the actor is aware that it will occur in 
the ordinary course of events,’60 or that intent means that the defendant acted 
‘with his mind on the act and its consequences, and willing them’.61 In Strugar 
                                                 
54  Cryer et al., 2019, p. 366. See in particular early cases, e.g. Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. 
(“Čelebići case”), (Case No. IT-96-21), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 16 November 1998 para. 
326, 439; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, (Case No. IT-95-14/1), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 25 June 
1999, para. 55; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, (Case No. IT-95-14), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 3 March 
2000, para. 153. 
55  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 1993, Article 4.2; 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994, Article 2.2. 
56  Cryer et al., 2019, p. 366. 
57  Cryer et al., 2019, p. 366. It should however be pointed out that it is somewhat unclear 
whether the authors mean intention or intent. For the sake of clarity it should also be noted 
that this statement does not apply to genocide, which clearly specifies the requisite mens rea. 
58  Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 190. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Musema, (Case No. ICTR-96-13), ICTR T. 
Ch., judgment, 27 January 2000; Prosecutor v. Stakić, (Case No. IT-97-24), ICTY T. Ch., 
judgment, 31 July 2005.  
59  Prosecutor v. Tadić, (Case No. IT-94-1), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 674; 
Aleksovski, ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 25 June 1999, para. 61. 
60  Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Case No. ICTR-95-1), ICTR T. Ch., judgment, 21 
May 1999, para. 139; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., (Case No. IT-95-16), ICTY T. Ch., 
judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 561. 
61  Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović and Kubura, (Case No. IT-01-47), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 15 
March 2006, para. 40. 
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the ICTY Trial Chamber referred to direct intent, but without defining it.62 
However, in Delić and in Perišić the Chamber defined direct intent as the 
defendant’s desire to cause a particular consequence as the result of his act or 
omission.63 Consequently, it could be argued that the jurisprudence somewhat 
reflects the common law definition of direct intent, i.e. that the defendant acted 
with an aim, purpose, or objective to bring about a result, as seen above. 
However, it is not always easy to categorise what the ICTY and the ICTR 
have considered to be an alternative to direct intent.64 According to some, the 
jurisprudence is inconclusive since the Tribunals have also accepted 
recklessness for many crimes, and have not drawn any clear boundaries between 
intent and recklessness.65 Indeed, some of the jurisprudence seems to be 
particularly confused regarding indirect intent (dolus indirectus) and 
recklessness (dolus eventualis).  
For example, in Čelebići the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that ‘under the 
theory of indirect intention (dolus eventualis), should an accused engage in life-
endangering behaviour, his killing is deemed intentional if he “makes peace” 
with the likelihood of death.’66 However, making peace with the consequence of 
one’s conduct seems to be very different to the standard of indirect intent or 
dolus indirectus. There, the result is a virtually certain consequence or a probable 
outcome of the conduct, and thus, the Čelebići definition seems closer to the 
mens rea category of recklessness than to indirect intent. Subsequent cases 
provided little clarity. The Trial Chamber thus appears to have stated that where 
a defendant made peace with the likelihood of a consequence of his or her 
conduct, e.g. death, he or she had the mens rea of dolus eventualis, meaning 
recklessness. This in turn meant that the killing became intentional, even if the 
conduct was of minimal risk.67 The interpretation of dolus eventualis thus 
appears to have included both recklessness and intent.  
Later cases have, however, brought a certain measure of clarity. In Strugar, 
the ICTY Trial Chamber appeared to suggest that the use of the term dolus 
eventualis by the Tribunal had caused confusion and that “indirect intent” was 
the preferred term.68 The Chamber stated that to prove murder, absent direct 
intent, it was required that death resulted from an act or omission, ‘in the 
                                                 
62  Prosecutor v. Strugar, (Case No. 01-42), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 31 January 2005, para. 
235-236. 
63  Prosecutor v. Delić, (Case No. 04-83), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 15 September 2008, para. 48; 
Prosecutor v. Perišić, (Case No. 04-81), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 6 September 2011, para. 
104. 
64  Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 190. 
65  Cryer et al., 2019, p. 366. See also Cassese & Gaeta, 2013, p. 48. 
66  Čelebići, ICTY T. Ch., 16 November 1998, para. 435. 
67  Stakić, ICTY T. Ch., 31 July 2005, para. 587; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, (Case No. 
99-36), ICTY T. Ch., judgment, 1 September 2004, para. 386; Hadžihasanović and Kubura, 
ICTY T. Ch., 15 March 2006, para. 31. 
68  Cassese & Gaeta, 2013, p. 49; Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 191; Strugar, ICTY T. Ch., 31 January 
2005, para. 235. 
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knowledge that death is a probable consequence.’69 The Trial Chamber stressed 
that  
knowledge by the accused that his act or omission might possibly cause death is not 
sufficient to establish the necessary mens rea. The necessary mental state exists when 
the accused knows that it is probable that his act or omission will cause death.70  
This approach was supported by the Trial Chamber in Delić and in Perišić, 
where the Chamber held that indirect intent comprises knowledge that the death 
of a victim was a probable or likely consequence of the defendant’s act or 
omission.71 
The cases mentioned above show that indirect intent at the ICTY thus appears 
to require knowledge that the consequence of one’s conduct is at least 
probable.72 This seems to be closer to dolus indirectus than to dolus eventualis, 
at least as classified above. However, in comparison to the common law standard 
of “indirect intent”, the standard in Strugar and in Delić would not quite reach 
the level of the virtual certainty test required in English law, as seen above. Thus, 
the ICTY used a degree of culpability in its interpretation of indirect intent that 
is lower than in for example English common law, but that is higher than 
recklessness.73 
4.3 Intent at the ICC 
Unlike the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, the Rome Statute of the ICC 
specifies the default mens rea to be intent, which is to be applied unless 
otherwise indicated.74 Article 30 states that:  
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material 
elements are committed with intent and knowledge. 
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:  
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
                                                 
69  Strugar, ICTY T. Ch., 31 January 2005, para. 236. 
70  Strugar, ICTY T. Ch., 31 January 2005, para. 236. 
71  Delić, ICTY T. Ch., 15 September 2008, para. 48; Perišić, ICTY T. Ch., 6 September 2011, 
para. 104. 
72  Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 191. 
73  See also Guilfoyle, 2016, p. 191. 
74  Genocide, for example, requires a different form of mens rea, see Rome Statute, 1998, Article 
6, which specifies that genocide requires special intent.  
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3. For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance 
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. "Know" and 
"knowingly" shall be construed accordingly. 
The Elements of Crimes75 further clarify that ‘where no reference is made in the 
Elements … to a mental element for any particular conduct, consequence or 
circumstance listed, it is understood that the relevant mental element, i.e., intent, 
knowledge or both, set out in Article 30 applies.’76 By requiring intent for the 
offences listed in the Rome Statute, ‘unless otherwise provided’, the Statute 
adopts as default a highly culpable form of mens rea. This may have important 
effects in relation to the offences for which customary international law and 
many domestic systems differ from the provision in the Statute and the ICC 
Elements of Crimes as to the mens rea required.77 This issue will be discussed 
below in Section 6. For example, in customary international law recklessness is 
enough to establish the mens rea for the war crime of intentionally attacking 
civilians.78 However, as a result of the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, 
the same crime, in Article 8(2)(b)(i), requires the higher mens rea of intention. 
The Rome Statute thus requires a higher level of culpability on the part of the 
defendant than customary international law.79  
Pre-Trial Chambers at the ICC have stated that the requirements of “intent 
and knowledge” in Article 30 ‘reflect the concept of dolus, which requires the 
existence of a volitional as well as a cognitive element.’80 It is generally 
acknowledged that the concept of dolus (i.e. intent) in Article 30 includes at least 
two categories: (1) dolus directus, interpreted as direct intent, and (2) dolus 
indirectus, interpreted as indirect intent.81 
According to ICC jurisprudence, dolus directus means that the defendant (1) 
‘knows that his or her acts of omissions will bring about the material elements 
of the crime’, and (2) ‘carries out these acts or omissions with the purposeful 
                                                 
75  The Elements of Crimes is a document separate from the Rome Statute intended to assist the 
ICC in the interpretation and application of Articles 6, 7, and 8 on genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. The document contains more detailed definitions of the offences 
and is intended to be used together with the Rome Statute.  
76  Elements of Crimes, 2013, General introduction, para. 2. 
77  Cryer et al., 2019, p. 367. 
78  Regarding the issue of attacks on civilians and mens rea, Ohlin, 2013. 
79  Cryer et al., 2019, p. 367. 
80  Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) 
of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 357. See also Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC 
PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, 
para. 351; Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008, para. 529. 
81  See e.g. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, paras 351-352; 
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008, para. 
529; Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 357; 
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 
January 2012, para. 411. 
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will (intent) or desire to bring about those material elements of the crime.’82 
However, as has been pointed out by some scholars, the ICC’s view on dolus 
directus appears to be more stringent than direct intent in either common or civil 
domestic law.83 As discussed above (Section 2, Intent in Common and Civil Law 
Systems), civil law and common law systems do not require knowledge of a 
consequence, but only that the defendant commits and act or omission with the 
intent, i.e. the object, purpose, or aim, to bring about a certain consequence or 
result. Knowledge of a particular degree of likelihood that the consequence will 
in fact occur is not necessary in either system. Consequently, in this regard the 
ICC requirements are higher than those in civil law and common law.  
The ICC has also explained how it views dolus indirectus. According to the 
Court, Article 30(2)(b) of the Rome Statute should be read to mean that dolus 
indirectus ‘does not require that the [defendant] has the actual intent or will to 
bring about the material elements of the crime, but that he or she is aware that 
those elements will be the almost inevitable outcome of his [or her] acts or 
omissions, i.e., “the suspect is aware that [...] [the consequence] will occur in the 
ordinary course of events”’.84 The words ‘will occur in the ordinary course of 
events’ in Article 30 were held by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba to clearly 
indicate that the standard required is close to certainty.85 
The Chamber defined ‘this standard as “virtual certainty” or “practical 
certainty”, namely that the consequence will follow, barring an unforeseen or 
unexpected intervention that prevent [sic] its occurrence.’86 Indirect intent as 
defined at the ICC thus appears to be in line with English law, according to which 
indirect intent means that the consequence of the defendant’s conduct is a virtual 
certainty and that the defendant appreciates this. 
Despite this relatively clear view of the ICC, there are examples where the 
Court has interpreted things differently. One Pre-Trial Chamber tried to use the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR to read recklessness (dolus eventualis) 
into Article 30.87 In the decision on confirmation of charges in the Lubanga case, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that the mens rea of “intent and knowledge” in 
Article 30, 
encompasses, first and foremost, those situations in which the suspect (i) knows that 
his or her actions or omissions will bring about the objective elements of the crime, 
and (ii) undertakes such actions or omissions with the concrete intent to bring about 
                                                 
82  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 358. See also 
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, para. 351; Katanga and 
Ngudjolo Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008 para. 529; Muthaura, 
Kenyatta and Ali, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 January 2012, para. 411. 
83  See Finnin, 2012, p. 342–343. 
84  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 359. See also 
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, para. 352: the defendant 
‘without having the concrete intent to bring about the objective elements of the crime, is 
aware that such elements will be the necessary outcome of his or her actions or omissions’. 
85  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 362. 
86  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 362. 
87  Cryer et al., 2019, p. 367. Dolus eventualis has been held to mean recklessness, see Bemba 
Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 357. 
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the objective elements of the crime (also known as dolus directus of the first 
degree).88 
The Chamber then stated that the mens rea also included other forms of dolus, 
which had been used by the ICTY. The first is where the defendant does not have 
‘the concrete intent to bring about’ the crime, but ‘is aware that [this] will be the 
outcome of his or her actions or omissions (also known as dolus directus of the 
second degree).’89 The second form is where the defendant ‘(a) is aware of the 
risk that the … crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, and (b) 
accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it or consenting 
to it (also known as dolus eventualis).’90 
In the Katanga case the same Pre-Trial Chamber stated that a majority of the 
Chamber still endorsed this view. However, the Chamber found that for the 
purposes of the charges discussed it was ‘not necessary to determine whether 
situations of dolus eventualis could also be covered by this offence, since, as 
shown later, there are substantial grounds to believe that the crimes were 
committed with dolus directus.’91 
The interpretation of Article 30 by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga has 
been criticised for not being supported by either the wording of Article 30 (‘will 
occur in the ordinary course of events’) or its drafting history, and in fact being 
explicitly rejected by the drafters of the Rome Statute.92 Indeed, as some 
commentators stated, unless otherwise provided, Article 30 ‘leaves no room for 
dolus eventualis or recklessness.’93 
In addition, this was also the opinion of a different Pre-Trial Chamber. In the 
Bemba case the Chamber concluded that ‘with respect to dolus eventualis as the 
third form of dolus, recklessness or any lower form of culpability’ was not 
included in Article 30.94  
To arrive at this conclusion the Chamber used the travaux préparatoires of 
the Rome Statute, as well as methods of interpretation of international law 
established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in Articles 31 and 
32. These Articles allow for a literal (textual) interpretation of treaty terms and 
for interpretation of the travaux préparatoires of international conventions or 
treaties. In view of these methods of interpretation the Pre-Trial Chamber found 
that ‘the words “will occur”, read together with the phrase “in the ordinary 
                                                 
88  Lubanga Dyilo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, para. 351.  
89  Lubanga Dyilo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, para. 352. 
90  Lubanga Dyilo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007, para. 352. 
91  Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008, para. 
251, footnote 329. 
92  See e.g. van der Vyver, Johan D, The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens 
Rea in International Criminal Law, University of Miami International and Comparative Law 
Review, 2004, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 66, 70–71; Werle, Gerhard & Jessberger, Florian, Unless 
Otherwise Provided: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes Under 
International Criminal Law, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2005, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 
51–53; Ohlin, 2013, p. 100–103; Cryer et al., 2019, p. 367.  
93  Werle & Jessberger, 2005, p. 53.  
94  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 360. See also paras 
364–369. 
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course of events” [in Article 30], clearly indicate that the required standard of 
occurrence is close to certainty.’95 The Chamber held that the standard was 
‘“virtual certainty” or “practical certainty”, namely that the consequences will 
follow, barring an unforeseen or unexpected intervention that prevents its 
occurrence.’96 This standard, the Chamber stated, is ‘undoubtedly higher’ than 
the standard commonly agreed upon for dolus eventualis, namely ‘foreseeing the 
occurrence of the undesired consequences as a mere likelihood or possibility.’97 
The Pre-Trial Chamber also stated that the language of Article 30, ‘does not 
accommodate a lower standard than the one required by dolus directus in the 
second degree [indirect intent].’98 In addition the Chamber stated that 
interpretation of Article 30 ensured that the concept of de lege lata was not 
substituted by the concept of de lege ferenda ‘only for the sake of widening the 
scope of Article 30 of the Statute and capturing a broader range of 
perpetrators.’99  
The same Pre-Trial Chamber seemingly continued this approach in its 
decision on the confirmation of charges in Kenyatta case, where the Chamber 
did not even discuss dolus eventualis as a possible form of intention.100 The 
approach was also endorsed by the Trial Chambers in the Lubanga and Katanga 
cases.101  
In conclusion, from the jurisprudence discussed above some patterns emerge. 
First, intent in the Rome Statute has been interpreted to refer only to direct and 
indirect intent. Second, it is clear that dolus eventualis, which in many (but not 
all) civil law countries is the lowest degree of intent, is too low a form of mens 
rea to be the basis of criminal responsibility. Nor does recklessness suffice for 
criminal responsibility. From a Swedish perspective this is interesting since the 
starting point in Swedish law is that if intent is required, the lowest form of intent 
(i.e. reckless intent) is enough. This applies as long as the provision in question 
does not require a different – higher – degree of intent.  
                                                 
95  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 361-362. 
96  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 362. 
97  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 363. 
98  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 360. 
99  Bemba Gombo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 369.  
100  Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 January 2012.  
101  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the 
Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012, para. 1011; Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC T. Ch. II, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014, para. 774-
776. 
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5 Intent in Swedish Legislation and Case Law Regarding 
International Crimes 
5.1 Some Remarks on the Relationship Between the General and Special 
Parts of Criminal Law 
In many civil law jurisdictions, including Sweden, a distinction is made between 
the general part and the special part of criminal law. The general part includes 
provisions, principles etc. that should be applied regardless of the offence. 
Matters concerning the applicable forms of mens rea usually belong to this part. 
The special part of criminal law, on the other hand, includes definitions of 
offences i.e. the actus reus elements that need to be fulfilled. When analysing 
the special part of criminal law, the analysis thus needs to focus on the actus reus 
elements required for a particular offence.  
Before turning to the Swedish case law concerning intent for international 
crimes, some general remarks regarding the relationship between the general and 
special parts of criminal law should be noted. When analysing the general part 
of criminal law it is necessary to observe how it relates to the special part, since 
the two are highly intertwined and cannot be separated from each other. It is thus 
arguably impossible to analyse matters that belong to the general part in isolation 
from the special part. For example, when addressing a certain offence, i.e. the 
actus reus elements of the offence, the general part of criminal law might need 
to be understood in a certain way for one type of offence and in a different way 
for another offences.102  
The above-mentioned issues concerning the relationship between the general 
and special parts of criminal law may occur in relation to intent. The Swedish 
Criminal Code, Ch. 1 Sec. 2 para. 1 simply states that the mens rea to be applied 
is intent. Furthermore, unless otherwise stated in a specific provision, the lowest 
form of intent (i.e. reckless intent) is sufficient to conclude that the defendant 
acted with intent. Thus, there is a certain margin for both the legislator and the 
judiciary to apply different forms of intent to different offences. If this happens, 
the issue of intent, which usually belongs to the general part of criminal law, has 
arguably become a matter concerning the special part. In such cases, the offence 
has been constructed in a way that ties a particular form of intent to that particular 
                                                 
102  One example of the difficulty in trying to separate the general part of criminal law from the 
special part is the general provision on attempt, in particular whether the defendant has 
reached the starting-point of an attempt, i.e. the point when the planning or preparation of the 
offence ends and the commission begins. From Swedish criminal law textbooks, one could 
easily get the impression that the starting-point simply “belongs” to the general part of 
criminal law, see e.g. Asp et al., 2013, p. 402–406; Ågren et al., 2018, p. 144–150. Some 
support for this opinion can be found in a fairly recent Supreme Court case, see NJA 2017 s. 
531, where Asp was the reporting judge. An alternative view, where the starting-point 
“belongs” to the special part of criminal law, is perhaps preferable. It is very difficult to 
determine whether the starting-point of an attempt is reached without considering the 
wording of the offence in question. Therefore, it would be more suitable to claim that the 
starting-point for an attempted robbery is reached at a different time than that for fraud. The 
commentary of the Swedish Criminal Code seems to support this view, see Bäcklund, 
Agneta, et al., Brottsbalken (17 April 2019, Zeteo), commentary to the Swedish Criminal 
Code, Ch. 23 Sec. 1, under the heading Påbörjat utförande av visst brott. 
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offence, and thus not the general intent as otherwise expressed in the general part 
of criminal law.  
One example is the offence of terrorism, which consists of already 
criminalised acts. The distinctive characteristic of the offence lies in that the 
defendant must have acted with a special terrorism purpose. According to the 
Swedish Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences (2003:148) Sec. 
2, the terrorism offence is applicable when the defendant acted with the specific 
purpose of e.g. seriously intimidating a population or a population group. This 
is similar to the crime of genocide, which requires that the defendant committed 
certain acts with a special intent ‘to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group’.103 
5.2 Intent in the Swedish Travaux Préparatoires to the Act on Criminal 
Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War 
Crimes  
We now turn to the general observations that can be made from Swedish legal 
sources regarding intent for international crimes. In this context, it is interesting 
to investigate how Swedish law is intended to interact with international law. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, there is an important difference between the 
regulations applicable before and after 1 July 2014. The former, i.e. the provision 
on crime against international law, in the Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 22 Sec. 
6, allows Swedish courts to consider international customary law when 
adjudicating international crimes at the national level. However, according to the 
travaux préparatoires this is not possible in relation to the general part of 
criminal law, which includes intent.104 Therefore, when applying the provision 
on crime against international law, Swedish courts apply intent as discussed in 
Section 3 of this article. 
The question of intent for international crimes was raised in more detail in the 
travaux préparatoires of the newer regulation, i.e. the Act on Criminal 
Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes 
(2014:406). The Swedish government stated that the Rome Statute consists of 
general principles of criminal law and that the Statute does not require this part 
to be incorporated in the national legislation. The Swedish government therefore 
concluded that it was neither necessary nor appropriate to introduce a specific 
provision on intent for the international crimes regulated by the Act on Criminal 
Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes 
(2014:406). The government considered that the general part of Swedish 
criminal law should be applied in relation to these crimes.105 A similar opinion 
had also been expressed in a previous government inquiry.106 This inquiry 
suggested that some differences existed between the Rome Statute and Swedish 
criminal law concerning the scope and meaning of intent. However, since these 
                                                 
103  See e.g. Rome Statute, Article 6. 
104  Prop. 1953:142, p. 19. 
105  Prop. 2013/14:146, p. 71, 56. 
106  See SOU 2002:98, p. 321–322. However, note that this inquiry focused mainly on the 
construction of future legislation dealing with international crimes. 
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Swedish law to clarify the meaning and scope of intent in relation to international 
crimes.107 
Although a general provision on intent for international crimes has not been 
introduced into Swedish law, some provisions concerning international crimes 
do include a specific form of intent applicable to that offence. One example is 
genocide, which in Swedish law requires, as it does in international law, that the 
defendant acted with the intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group.108 With reference to international case law, the Swedish travaux 
préparatoires of the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes 
against Humanity and War Crimes (2014:406), state that when assessing 
whether the defendant acted with this special intent, the court should take into 
account both objective circumstances (e.g. the existence of a plan or policy to 
destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group) and subjective 
circumstances relating to the defendant (e.g. in what position he or she acted).109  
Statements were also made in the travaux préparatoires about intent in regard 
to crimes against humanity,110 i.e. certain enumerated acts as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population with knowledge of the 
attack. According to the travaux préparatoires the defendant does not need to 
have knowledge of every circumstance regarding the attack or understand that it 
constitutes an attack according to law. The defendant acted with intent if he or 
she had knowledge of the factual circumstances of the attack.111 The Swedish 
government further stated in the travaux préparatoires, with reference to ICTY 
case law, that the defendant’s conduct must be connected to the attack by virtue 
of its character or its result, and that the defendant must have knowledge of these 
circumstances or have acted with intent as to the circumstances.112 Regarding the 
act of killing as a war crime, the travaux préparatoires state that the defendant 
should be considered to have acted with the requisite intent if he or she intended 
the result i.e. the death of another person.113 However, the travaux préparatoires 
do not mention which form of intent is required in relation to war crimes. 
Therefore, it is enough if the defendant acted with reckless intent. 
                                                 
107  SOU 2002:98, p. 334. But note that this inquiry was presented around the time when the 
Rome Statute came into effect. Thus, when the inquiry presented it results there was for 
example no case law from the ICC that clarified the meaning of intent in the Rome Statute. 
The statements made in the inquiry should therefore be viewed with some caution. 
108  Act on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes 
(2014:406), Sec. 1. 
109  Prop. 2013/14:146, p. 80–82, 231–233. 
110  Act on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes 
(2014:406), Sec. 2. 
111  Prop. 2013/14:146, p. 97, 241. 
112  Prop. 2013/14:146, p. 97, 241. The travaux préparatoires here refer to ICTY, Appeal 
Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and Others, 2002, IT-96-23 -A and IT-
96-23/1-A, paras 99–101; ICTY, Appeal Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 1999, 
IT -94-1-A, para. 271; ICTY, Trial Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and 
Others, 2001, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, para. 418. 
113  Prop. 2013/14:146, p. 132. 
Ebba Lekvall and Dennis Martinsson: The Mens Rea Element of Intent in the  119 
Context of International Criminal Trials in Sweden  
 
 
After this discussion of the Swedish travaux préparatoires and the statements 
of the Swedish government in relation to the matter of intent regarding for 
international crimes, we now examine how this matter has been dealt with by 
Swedish courts. 
5.3 Intent in Swedish Case Law on International Crimes 
Several trends can be observed about intent in Swedish case law concerning 
international crimes. One is that the courts rarely conduct a thorough assessment 
regarding intent. There are several examples where the courts provide no 
analysis regarding which form of intent is applicable in the case or whether the 
defendant has acted with the intent required to find him or her liable.114  
Another trend is that in several cases the courts focus on whether there is 
enough evidence in the individual case to determine whether the defendant acted 
with intent. Thus, it seems that the matter of intent may in many cases get little 
attention, but that the important question is rather whether the prosecutor has 
brought forward enough evidence to allow the court to conclude that the 
defendant acted with intent.115 In addition, in some cases the courts assess 
whether the defendant acted with ‘necessary intent’, without clarifying the 
meaning and scope of the intent required.116 When the courts do to some extent 
assess the defendant’s intent, the indictment concerns crimes that require a 
specific intent, such as the terrorist offence117 mentioned above, or genocide.118 
Yet another trend concerns cases where the indictment includes co-
perpetration. In these cases, the courts state that a ‘joint intent’ exists, or use 
similar phrasing.119 Lastly, it is very clear from the Swedish case law examined 
for this article that the courts do not refer to international criminal law; there is 
a complete lack of references to international case law from the ICTY, the ICTR, 
and the ICC. 
A majority of the Swedish cases reviewed were decided based on the law in 
force until 1 July 2014, i.e. applying the provision on crime against international 
                                                 
114  In several cases the courts do not mention anything in particular about the intent or the type 
of intent, see e.g. Åklagaren ./. Mohamad Abdullah, Södertörns District Court, Case B 11191-
17, judgment, 25 September 2017; Åklagaren ./. Mouhannad Droubi, Södertörns District 
Court, Case B 2639-16, judgment, 11 May 2016; Åklagaren ./. Mouhannad Droubi, 
Södertörns District Court, Case B 13656-14, judgment, 26 February 2015; Åklagaren ./. 
Kurda Bahaalddin H Saeed, Örebro District Court, Case B 1662-18, judgment, 19 February 
2019. 
115  See e.g. Åklagaren ./. Jackie Arklöv, Stockholm District Court, Case B 4084-04, judgment, 
18 December 2006. 
116  See e.g. Åklagaren ./. Omar Sakhanh Haisam, Svea Court of Appeal, Case B 3787-16, 
judgment, 16 February 2017, p. 5 ff.; Åklagaren ./. Claver Berikindi, Svea Court of Appeal, 
Case B 4951-16, judgment, 15 February 2017, p. 20. 
117  See e.g. Åklagaren ./. Hassan Al-Mandlawi, Gothenburg District Court, Case B 9086-15, 
judgment, 14 December 2015, p. 34–36. 
118  See e.g. Åklagaren ./. Theodore Tabaro, Stockholm District Court, Case B 13688-16, 
judgment, 27 June 2018, p. 175–176. 
119  See e.g. Åklagaren ./. Claver Berinkindi, Stockholm District Court, Case B 12882-14, 
judgment, 16 May 2016, p. 87, 100, 102, 111, 123, 132, 135. 
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law.120 Only two cases were decided after the entry into force of the new 
regulation, i.e. the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against 
Humanity and War Crimes (2014:406).121 Therefore, some precaution is 
necessary when drawing conclusions about how Swedish courts have assessed 
intent in relation to the new regulation. Further, considering the limited number 
of cases decided by Swedish courts so far regarding international crimes, it is 
difficult to reach any clear conclusions about how the courts have reasoned in 
matters regarding intent, whether the 2014 Act or the previous legislation was 
applied. Since Swedish courts do not usually conduct a thorough assessment of 
intent, the discussion will focus on cases where the courts have provided 
reasoning about intent. 
In Droubi,122 the indictment concerned the offence of crime against 
international law (Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 22 Sec. 6 para. 1, applicable 
before 1 July 2014), for acts of, inter alia, “gross assault”123 allegedly committed 
in Syria. The defendant had joined an armed group fighting the Syrian regime 
                                                 
120  According to the translation by the Swedish government in Ds 1999:36, p. 102–103, crime 
against international law (Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 22 Sec. 6) was defined as: 
‘A person guilty of a serious violation of a treaty or agreement with a foreign power or an 
infraction of a generally recognised principle or tenet relating to international humanitarian 
Law concerning armed conflicts shall be sentenced for crime against international Law to 
imprisonment for at most four years. Serious violations shall be understood to include: 
1. use of any weapon prohibited by international law, 
2. misuse of the insignia of the United Nations or of insignia referred to in the Act on the 
Protection of Certain International Medical insignia (Law 1953:771), parliamentary 
flags or other internationally recognised insignia, or the killing or injuring of an 
opponent by means of some other form of treacherous behaviour, 
3. attacks on civilians or on persons who are injured or disabled, 
4. initiating an indiscriminate attack knowing that such attack will cause exceptionally 
heavy losses or damage to civilians or to civilian property, 
5. initiating an attack against establishments or installations which enjoy special 
protection under international law, 
6. occasioning severe suffering to persons enjoying special protection under international 
law; coercing prisoners of war or civilians to serve in the armed forces of their enemy 
or depriving civilians their liberty in contravention of international law; and 
7. arbitrarily and extensively damaging or appropriating property which enjoys special 
protection under international law in cases other than those described in points 1–6 
above.’ 
121  See Åklagaren ./. Raed Abdulkareem, Scania and Blekinge Court of Appeal, Case B 3187-
16, judgment, 4 April 2017; Åklagaren ./. Raed Abdulkareem, Blekinge District Court, Case 
B 569-16, judgment, 6 December 2016; Åklagaren ./. Kurda Bahaalddin H Saeed H Saeed, 
Örebro Court of Appeal, Case B 1662-18, judgment, 19 February 2019.  
122  Åklagaren ./. Mouhannad Droubi, Svea Court of Appeal, Case B 4770-16, judgment, 5 
August 2016; Droubi, 11 May 2016. 
123  According to the translation by the Swedish government, available at 
https://www.government.se/49f780/contentassets/7a2dcae0787e465e9a2431554b5eab03/th
e-swedish-criminal-code.pdf (Accessed 6 July 2020), the Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 3 Sec. 
6, p. 19–20, gross assault is defined as ’If an offence referred to in Section 5 is considered 
gross, the person is guilty of gross assault and is sentenced to imprisonment for at least one 
year and six months and at most six years. When assessing whether the offence is gross, 
particular consideration is given to whether the act was life-threatening or whether the 
perpetrator inflicted severe bodily injury or serious illness or otherwise displayed particular 
ruthlessness or brutality.’ 
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and had severely abused the victim through physical violence aimed at the 
victim’s head and body. The defendant had also threatened to kill the victim, 
thus causing the victim to feel severe agony. The gross assault was allegedly of 
such nature that it amounted to torture and therefore a breach of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.124 The Court of Appeal held that the defendant acted with reckless 
intent. In the Court’s opinion the defendant was aware of the existence of 
fighting between the Syrian regime and the opposition and that the defendant, at 
least, must have been aware of the risk that the circumstances were such that 
there was an internal armed conflict. The Court also held that the defendant must 
have accepted the risk that the victim belonged to the protected category. Lastly, 
the Court of Appeal held that the defendant was reckless both as to the fact that 
he tortured a helpless person and as to the consequences of this deed (i.e. risk 
that the victim would die as a result of the defendant’s actions).125 
Another case where the court provided reasoning about intent was Tabaro. 
The indictment concerned the offences of genocide (Act on Criminal 
Responsibility for Genocide (1964:169) Sec. 1, applicable before 1 July 2009) 
and “gross crime against international law” (Swedish Criminal Code Ch. 22 Sec. 
6 paras 1 and 2, applicable before 1 July 1995),126 for acts allegedly committed 
during the genocide in Rwanda.127 According to the indictment, the defendant 
had allegedly participated in several attacks on members of the Tutsi ethnic 
group. The attacks occurred at several locations, including several villages in a 
certain region, a school, and an abbey. 
The District Court presented a rather detailed reasoning when assessing 
whether the defendant acted with the special intent required for genocide. The 
Court held that the defendant, who had a leading role at the local political level, 
executed the policy of the government by killing members of the Tutsi ethnic 
group. The defendant had, among other things, unlawfully deprived Tutsis of 
their liberty by limiting their access to food, water, and health care necessary for 
their survival. The attacks that the defendant took part in were systematic and 
were executed continuously and in a manner that led to the death of a large 
number of Tutsis. The District Court thus held that the defendant had committed 
the acts with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the ethnical group of Tutsis, 
thus having the required special intent for genocide.128 The defendant appealed 
against the decision. Although the Court of Appeal partly acquitted the 
defendant, it still found the defendant guilty of genocide and gross crime against 
                                                 
124  Note that in Swedish criminal law there is no specific offence of torture. Torture is 
nevertheless criminalised in Sweden as the underlying act of other offences. Depending the 
circumstances, a case of torture could in Swedish criminal law be considered as the offence 
of gross assault, the offence of exceptionally gross assault, or attempt to murder. If the victim 
dies during the torture, it is clearly a case of murder. 
125  Droubi, 5 August 2016, p. 7–8. 
126  According to the translation by the Swedish government in Ds 1999:36, p. 103, ‘If the crime 
is gross, imprisonment for at most ten years, or for life shall be imposed. In assessing whether 
the crime is gross, special consideration shall be given to whether it comprised a large number 
of individual acts or whether a large number of persons were killed or injured, or whether the 
crime occasioned extensive loss of property.’ 
127  Tabaro, 27 June 2018. 
128  Tabaro, 27 June 2018, p. 176. 
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international law. Regarding the parts of the judgment in which the Court of 
Appeal agreed with the assessment of the District Court, the Court of Appeal 
merely stated that it agreed with the District Court’s assessment of the 
defendant’s intent without any further reasoning.129 
The indictment in the case of Berikindi also concerned acts of genocide (Act 
on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide (1964:169) Sec. 1, applicable before 1 
July 2009) and gross crime against international law (Swedish Criminal Code, 
Ch. 22 Sec. 6 paras 1 and 2, applicable before 1 July 1995), committed while 
participating in massacres and killings during the Rwanda genocide. The 
judgments of the District Court and Court of Appeal are quite complicated to 
summarise, since the indictment included several events that occurred at nearby 
– but separate – locations. The case also included extensive testimonial evidence, 
which contributes to the difficulties in summarising it. However, concerning the 
question of whether the defendant acted with the requisite intent, both courts 
held that, regarding genocide, the defendant acted with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, the Tutsi ethnic group.130 The Court of Appeal concluded that 
the evidence in the case showed that the defendant had expressed Hutu-extremist 
opinions, that he had participated in the arrangement of various activities in the 
genocide against Tutsis, and that he had acted together with other people with 
leading roles at the local political level during the genocide.131 
In addition, where the courts found that the defendants acted with special 
intent, there are examples where the courts seem to have concluded that the 
defendant acted with indirect intent. The case of Haisam is an example of this. 
The indictment concerned gross crime against international law (Swedish 
Criminal Code, Ch. 22 Sec. 6 paras 1 and 2, applicable before 1 July 2014) 
through participating in the execution of seven soldiers belonging to the Syrian 
army, and through killing one of them by shooting the victim, during the Syria 
conflict.132 The assessment of the Court of Appeal concentrated on the evidence 
in the case, including a film of the alleged conduct. The Court of Appeal held 
that the defendant had participated in the events in the film and therefore was 
aware of what had happened. Thus, the defendant could not avoid being aware 
of the fact that the Syrian soldiers had been assaulted before they were executed. 
In addition, the defendant shot one victim several times and after the execution 
raised his weapon as a sign of victory. The Court of Appeal held that the content 
of the film clearly supported the conclusion that the killings were unlawful. The 
Court also stated that the defendant must have realised that the soldiers were 
executed merely because of their status as soldiers of the Syrian regime and that 
the defendant realised that their execution was unlawful,133 thus acting with 
indirect intent. The defendant sought permission to appeal from the Swedish 
                                                 
129  Åklagaren ./. Theodore Tabaro, Svea Court of Appeal, Case B 6814-18, judgment, 29 April 
2019, e.g. p. 66. 
130  Berinkindi, 15 February 2017, p. 47, where the Court of Appeal refers to – and agrees with – 
the assessment of the District Court; Berinkindi, 16 May 2016, p. 12, 135–136. 
131  Berinkindi, 15 February 2017, p. 13–14, 45–46, 47. 
132  Haisam, 31 May 2017; Åklagaren ./. Omar Sakhanh Haisam, Stockholm District Court, Case 
B 3787-16, judgment, 16 February 2017. 
133  Haisam, 31 May 2017, p. 6–7. 
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Supreme Court, but the request was denied.134 Thus, the Swedish Supreme Court 
did not try the case. 
The case of Saeed is another case where the court seems to have found that 
the defendant acted with indirect intent.135 The defendant had joined the Iraqi 
army and fought against Daesh, or the Islamic State. The indictment concerned 
war crimes (Act on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes (2014:406), Sec. 1, para. 1 p. 7, and Sec. 2), alleged 
to have taken place in Iraq through the participation in humiliating treatment of 
four dead victims, members of an armed opposition group, by posing and 
publishing pictures of the victims’ corpses. The District Court did not mention 
intent as such, or forms of intent, and the matter of criminal liability mainly 
relied on technical evidence consisting of photographs and films. The evidence 
showed that the defendant had e.g. stamped on body parts of deceased victims, 
had spoken in derogatory terms about the deceased and had spat on them. The 
defendant had also aimed a rifle barrel at a lifeless body. The defendant had 
stated when questioned by the police, but not at trial, that he had stamped on 
dead bodies and/or body parts.136 The District Court found the defendant guilty 
of the indicted crimes. The Court of Appeal concurred with the assessment of 
the District Court. The Court of Appeal stated nothing in particular regarding 
intent, but concluded, inter alia, that the defendant was aware of his conduct. 
Thus, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.137 It should be noted that the 
defendant sought permission to appeal from the Swedish Supreme Court and the 
request was granted.138 However, the Supreme Court has not yet (in July 2020) 
pronounced a judgment in the case. 
The District Court’s assessment and reasoning as regarding the evidence in 
Saeed must, in our opinion, reasonably be interpreted to mean that the Court 
considered that the defendant was practically certain – and aware – of the facts 
that the indictment was based on, thus acting with indirect intent. However, note 
that the District Court did not explicitly formulate this in the written judgment. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw any other conclusion from the wordings of 
the judgment. 
In conclusion, the general impression from Swedish case law concerning 
intent in the context of international crimes is that the courts do not refer at all 
to the concept of intent as it exists and is defined in international criminal law. 
This position seems, as will be seen below, to be rather reasonable. However, it 
should be emphasised that in the cases examined above, the courts generally do 
not elaborate on the matter of intent. The only obvious conclusion is that the 
courts seem largely to treat the issue of intent as a matter of evidence. This 
appears to be in line with the approach of the Swedish Supreme Court (see above, 
                                                 
134  Åklagaren ./. Omar Sakhanh Haisam Sakhanh, Supreme Court, Case B 3157-17, decision, 
20 July 2017. 
135  Kurda Bahaalddin H Saeed H Saeed, 19 February 2019.  
136  Kurda Bahaalddin H Saeed H Saeed, 19 February 2019, p. 11–14. 
137  Åklagaren ./. Kurda Bahaalddin H Saeed H Saeed, Göta Court of Appeal, Case B 939-19, 
judgment, 24 September 2019, p. 3–5. 
138  Åklagaren ./. Kurda Bahaalddin H Saeed H Saeed, Supreme Court, Case B 5595-19, 
decision, 23 March 2020. 
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Section 3, Intent in Swedish Law). However, the case law of the Supreme Court 
mainly concerns reckless intent, while international crimes, such as genocide, 
sometimes require a higher form of intent. Therefore, it would be desirable for 
Swedish courts to be clearer regarding the issue of intent in future cases, and not 
it simply as a matter of evidence. In doing so Swedish courts could, in our view, 
contribute to a clearer development regarding intent in the context of 
international crimes adjudicated at the national level. 
6 Analysis: Reflections Regarding how Swedish Courts Should 
Deal with Intent When Adjudicating International Crimes  
Previous sections have shown how intent is defined in Swedish and in 
international criminal law. They have also shown how Swedish courts have dealt 
with intent in cases involving international crimes, and have concluded that no 
reference is made to international criminal law in these cases. In view of this, we 
will now discuss how Swedish courts should deal with intent for international 
crimes and whether Swedish courts should apply international criminal law rules 
regarding intent.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the regulation applicable to offences 
committed before 1 July 2014 allows the courts to consider, to a certain extent, 
customary international law when adjudicating international crimes at the 
national level. This follows from the wording of the provision on crime against 
international law (Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 22 Sec. 6) and the travaux 
préparatoires. During the work on the travaux préparatoires the question was 
raised whether national law or general principles of international law should be 
applied by national courts with regard to international crimes. Ultimately, the 
travaux préparatoires stated that the general part of national criminal law should 
be applied to international crimes.139 Particular reference was made to the 
travaux préparatoires of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, from which it is clear 
that no agreement could be reached regarding issues relating to the general part 
of national criminal law. In addition, it was pointed out that these issues should 
be left to national courts.140 Regarding the regulation applicable before 1 July 
2014, it therefore appears clear that the general part of Swedish criminal law, 
which includes intent, should be applied to international crimes adjudicated 
before Swedish courts. 
                                                 
139  Prop. 1953:142, p. 19. 
140  Final record of the diplomatic conference of Geneva of 1949 vol. II, section B, p. 114-115: 
‘The Netherlands Delegation had tabled the International Committee of the Red Cross' 
Articles as their own amendment. This amendment has been replaced by the joint amendment 
submitted by the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, the United States of America, 
France, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The Netherlands Delegate 
presented the joint amendment with the following introduction: […] The word ‘crime’ 
instead of ‘breach’ did not seem to be an improvement, nor could general agreement be 
reached at this stage regarding the notions of complicity, attempted violation, duress or 
legitimate defence or the plea ‘by orders of a superior’. These should be left to the judges 
who would apply the national laws. The Diplomatic Conference is not here to work out 
international penal law. Bodies far more competent than we are have tried to do it for years. 
[…] This was adopted.’ [Emphasis added.] 
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However, it may be worth noting that the previous offence of crime against 
international law was, inter alia, defined as a “serious violation” of customary 
international law.141 Even if one considers the travaux préparatoires mentioned 
above, does this reference to customary international law warrant a different 
assessment? Does it relate only to the definition of the actus reus of an 
international crime, or does it also relate to the question of intent? And if intent 
is also decided by customary international law, where is this customary 
international law found? 
A reading of the provision in question (crime against international law, 
Swedish Criminal Code, Ch. 22 Sect. 6, applicable before 1 July 2014) indicates 
that the mention of customary international law must refer to conduct that is 
prohibited under customary international law. In other words, it is the actus reus 
parts of the offence that are defined by customary international law, not issues 
relating to intent, which falls under the mens rea parts of the offence. However, 
if one wants to argue that also the issue of mens rea is defined by customary 
international law, one has to investigate where such a definition could be found. 
Could, for example, the Rome Statute be considered customary international 
law? 
Since the Rome Statute is the only document that provides a definition of 
intent in international criminal law, and which – at least partly – constitutes 
customary international law, it could be questioned whether Article 30 of the 
Statute does in fact include a definition of intent that can be considered 
customary law. This is however doubtful for several reasons.  
First, Article 30 of the Rome Statute is found in Part 3 of the Statute, 
containing general principles of criminal law. In our view, these principles do 
not all – unlike the provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes – necessarily reflect customary international law. Furthermore, many of 
these general principles of the Rome Statute are the result of negotiations and 
compromises,142 and are contained in a document which primarily governs a 
court’s administration of law.143 Consequently, it is difficult to argue that they 
constitute customary international law.  
It should also be recalled that customary international law, somewhat 
simplified, consists of rules that have emerged through continuing practice by 
States and the conviction that such practice is a legal obligation.144 Regarding 
                                                 
141  According to the translation by the Swedish government in Ds 1999:36, p. 102–103, crime 
against international law was defined as: ‘A person guilty of a serious violation of a treaty 
or agreement with a foreign power or an infraction of a generally recognised principle or 
tenet relating to international humanitarian Law concerning armed conflicts shall be 
sentenced for crime against international Law to imprisonment for at most four years (…)’. 
142  Scheffer, David, ‘The International Criminal Court’, in Schabas, William & Bernaz, Nadia 
(eds.), Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, London: Routledge 2011, p. 76. 
This is also the view of the Swedish government, see prop. 2013/14:146, p. 71, 212. 
143  See e.g. Scheffer, 2011, p. 76. 
144  Cassese, Antonio, International Law, 2 edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 156; 
Thirlway, Hugh, ‘The Sources of International Law’, in Evans, Malcolm D., (ed.), 
International Law, 4 edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 98. See also Roberts, 
Anthea & Sivakmaran, Sandesh, ‘The Theory and Reality of the Sources of International 
Law’, in Evans, Malcolm D., (ed.), International Law, 5 edn., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018, p. 92–97. 
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intent, it should be noted that, as mentioned above, Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute is the result of a compromise between the negotiating parties and thus a 
compromise between common law and civil law systems. In addition, as shown 
above in Section 2 (Intent in Common and Civil Law Systems), there is no clear, 
common view among these systems about the exact meaning of intent. 
Furthermore, there is no exact definition of intent even among countries within 
these legal systems. This makes it difficult to view Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
as a customary international law rule regarding intent. Thus, in our view it is 
clear that the general part of Swedish criminal law should be applied by courts 
when deciding cases regarding international crimes based on the Swedish 
regulation applicable before 1 July 2014. 
The general part of Swedish criminal law should also be applied to the Act 
on Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War 
Crimes (2014:406). The primary reason for this is that the Rome Statute is not a 
legally binding treaty for States Parties in the same way as is, e.g. an international 
convention on human rights, which imposes certain obligations on States. 
Instead, the Rome Statute specifies rules and principles governing the work of 
the ICC.145 States Parties to the Statute recognise the ICC’s jurisdiction and 
competency, and are indeed obliged to cooperate with the Court.146 However, 
this does not entail a legal obligation on States Parties to incorporate the 
provisions of the Rome Statute into national law. This is also the view of the 
Swedish government. As seen above, in the travaux préparatoires to the Act on 
Criminal Responsibility for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War 
Crimes (2014:406), the government emphasised in particular that the Rome 
Statute does not impose any obligation on States to incorporate into national law 
the provisions relating to the Statute’s general principles of criminal law.147 The 
government was therefore of the opinion that it was not necessary to develop 
special provisions regarding, inter alia, intent and that the Swedish provisions 
on the general part of criminal law should, as a starting point, be applied by 
Swedish courts when adjudicating international crimes.148 
Furthermore, the government was of the view that it would also not be 
appropriate to introduce special rules about for example intent for international 
                                                 
145  This is obvious from Article 1 of the Rome Statute. See also Cassese & Gaeta, 2013, p. 10: 
‘It is also important to note that many criminal lawyers, particularly in countries of Romaneo-
Germanic tradition, being used to interpreting and applying criminal rules laid down in 
written criminal codes, tend to believe that the major source of ICL can be found in the Statute 
of the ICC, or at least that such Statute is a sort of “code of international criminal law”. This 
is a wrong assumption, although admittedly that Statute is the only international written 
instrument laying down international rules on both the “general part” of ICL and a fairly 
comprehensive definition of international crimes. The truth of the matter is, however, that 
the ICC Statute embraces a set of rules only applicable by the ICC itself: the Statute does not 
apply to other international criminal courts’. [Emphasis added.] It is our view that this quote 
is also applicable to national courts dealing with international crimes.  
146  See part 9 of the Rome Statute about international cooperation and judicial assistance. 
147  Prop. 2013/14:146, p. 71, 212–213. 
148  Prop. 2013/14:146, p. 71, 212–213. However, the government pointed out that in some 
respects other considerations are made, e.g. for military and civilian command responsibility 
and inchoate offences, as well as incitement of genocide. See further prop. 2013/14:146, p. 
200–216. 
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crimes into national law.149 The government did not elaborate further on this 
position. However, others have discussed the fragmentation that may occur when 
dealing with international crimes at the national level, and States feel obliged to 
apply principles for international crimes that are incompatible with those 
otherwise applied at the national level.150 Some of the principles that could cause 
problems are those that fall under part 3 of the Rome Statute on general 
principles of criminal law, which include intent. If intent according to Article 30 
of the Rome Statute were to be applied in Swedish law in cases concerning 
international crimes, parallel systems would be created within the national legal 
system regarding the rules of which form of mens rea would be required. In cases 
regarding international crimes, a national court would then apply different rules 
of intent depending on whether the offence in question was an international 
crime or not. This would be problematic since general principles of criminal law 
within a national system should be universally applicable to all offences 
prosecuted within that system. An exception would of course be those offences 
which specify a particular form of mens rea, for example genocide. Intent should 
thus, in general, mean the same thing within a legal system, regardless of the 
offence.  
More specifically the above means the following. As concluded in Section 
4.3 (Intent at the ICC), Article 30 of the Rome Statute includes dolus directus 
and dolus indirectus, i.e. what in Swedish law corresponds to direct intent and 
indirect intent. Thus, Article 30 of the Rome Statute does not include the lowest 
degree of intent in Swedish law, i.e. reckless intent. If Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute were to be applied to international crimes brought before Swedish courts, 
this would in practice mean that a higher degree of intent would be required for 
these crimes than what is otherwise required in Swedish criminal law. This 
would make it more difficult to convict somebody in Sweden of an international 
crime than it would of other crimes. Consequently, the coherence of the national 
criminal justice system would be eroded. In conclusion, for the reasons stated 
above, and as stated by the Swedish government, it cannot be considered 
appropriate to introduce into Swedish law special rules regarding intent for 
international crimes. 
  
                                                 
149  Prop. 2013/14:146, p. 71, 212–213. For a more in-depth discussion, see Klamberg, Mark, 
The Evolution of Swedish Legislation on International Crimes, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 
2020, vol. 66, Section 6. 
150  See Greenawalt, Alexander, The Pluralism of International Criminal Law, Indiana Law 
Journal 2011, vol. 86, no. 3, 1064, p. 1068. See also van Sliedregt, Elies, Individual Criminal 
Responsibility in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 9–12. 
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